Top Syrians on CAH List

International investigators have submitted a list of Syrian military and political officials suspected of crimes against humanity to the UN’s top human rights official, their report said on Thursday.

See the RNW website for the full article.

Steven Kay QC lecture at SOAS 20 February 2012

Steven Kay QC has been asked by Professor Chandra Lekha Sriram to talk to students at SOAS  on Complementarity and the Prosecution of Heads of State at 17.00 on 20 February 2012. School of Law, University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), Thornhaugh Street, Russell Square, London WC1H 0XG

Law Minister Threatens Action Against ICT Critics

The Bangladesh Law Minister in a desperate attempt to prevent criticism of his International Crimes Tribunal, is trying to silence national and international criticism by threatening legal action against those brave enough to try and seek fair trials.

The right to free speech is guaranteed under Article 39 of the Bangladeshi Constitution.

Ghulam Azam Denied Bail

Former Jamaat Islami chief, 89 year-old Professor Ghulam Azam, has been denied bail by the Special Crimes Tribunal, Bangladesh.

See below for the full article:

http://www.internationallawbureau.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Prof-Ghulam-Azam-Article.pdf

Why Does Promotion of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights Matter?

In the heart of Africa, the African Court of Human and Peoples’ rights sits in relative obscurity. Few know how to use it and it is in serious danger of being marginalised. At some point in the future, the court will be merged with the Court of Justice of the African Union, in order to form the permanent African Court of Justice and Human Rights. A protocol to this effect was adopted at the AU Summit in July 2008 (the “Merged Court Protocol”).

See the ARC Project’s website for Gill Higgins’ full article.

http://arcproject.co.uk/?p=273

The ACtHPR: Case Progression from the Commission to the Court

Introduction

The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court of Human Peoples’ Rights (the “Protocol”) states that the attainment of the objectives of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the “Charter”) requires the establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (the “Court”) to complement and reinforce the functions of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (the “Commission”). Under Article 2 of the Protocol, the Court is to complement the protective mandate of the Commission. The Court started its operations in Addis Ababa in November 2006 and moved its seat to Arusha, Tanzania in August 2007. The rules of the Court were finalized in June 2008.

Where a State party is alleged to have violated a provision of the Charter, the Commission, broadly speaking, seeks to protect human and peoples’ rights through the regulation of a system of “written communications” – which can be sent to the Commission by States parties or individuals – and by drafting reports and making recommendations. This post examines the Commission’s mandate, the system of written communications and how a case can by submitted by the Commission to the Court.

The Commission’s Mandate

Article 45 of the Charter explains that the Commission has the following functions: (a) to promote human and peoples’ rights; (b) to ensure the protection of human and peoples’ rights; (c) to act as the interpreter of the Charter; and (d) to perform any other task which may be entrusted to it by the Assembly of the Heads of State of the African Union (the “Assembly”). The role of the Court is to complement and reinforce the Commission’s duties under Article 45(b) of the Charter.

Communication from States

Where a State party has good reason to believe that another State party has violated a Charter provision, it is entitled, by way of a written communication, to draw the attention of the State, the Commission and the African Union (the “AU”) to the matter. The enquiring State is entitled to a written explanation within three months. If the two States cannot resolve the issue, both have a right to refer the matter to the Commission. In any event, a State party may simply refer the matter directly to the Commission and the AU, where a breach of the Charter is alleged.

Once a matter is submitted, the Commission must ensure that all local remedies have been exhausted, unless the procedure for achieving these remedies would be unduly prolonged.

In terms of investigation, the Commission is entitled to request the States concerned to provide information, or to submit written or oral applications. The Charter also states that the Commission may obtain and consider information from any other source it deems necessary.

Following consideration of relevant and necessary information, the Commission is required to record its facts and findings in a report, which it must communicate to the States concerned and the Assembly. The Commission is also entitled to make recommendations to the Assembly.

Other Communications

The Commission may also consider communications other than those submitted by States parties (“non-State communications”).

Primarily, for any non-State communication to be considered by the Commission, it must relate to human and peoples’ rights. However, Article 56 of the Charter sets out a number of further conditions that must be adhered to, namely that all non-State communications: (a) must contain an indication of the identity of the author; (b) must be compatible with the Charter; (c) must not be written in disparaging or insulting language directed against the State concerned or the AU; (d) must not be based exclusively on material from the mass media; (e) must be sent after exhausting local remedies; (f) must be submitted within a reasonable period; and (g) must not deal with cases that have already been settled. The Commission must agree by simple majority that a non-State application be considered. Before any substantive consideration can take place, the Commission must inform the State in question.

Article 58 covers “special cases” in which non-State communications reveal the existence of “serious or massive violations of human and peoples’ rights”. In “special cases”, the Assembly or the Chairman of the Assembly is entitled to request that in addition to the Commission’s findings and recommendations, it conducts an in-depth study and produces a factual report.

The Relationship between the Commission and the Court

The most recent version of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission (the “Rules”) contains a section dedicated to the relationship between the Commission and the Court. The Rules set out the basic interactive framework between the two institutions, including provisions on: (a) complementarity; (b) consultations between the Commission, the Court and their respective Bureaus; (c) the interpretation of the Charter by the Commission in response to a request under Article 45(3); (d) advisory opinions under Article 4(1) of the Protocol; (e) seizure of the Court; (f) opinions on admissibility under Article 6 of the Protocol; (g) representation of the Commission before the Court; (h) the content of the application and file to the Court; (i) the transmission of cases to the Court and notification of the parties; and (j) lis pendens.

Submitting Cases to the Court

In addition to providing the Commission with a power to seize the Court with any case at any time of the proceedings, the Rules specify that it may submit a case to the Court under Article 5(1)(a) of the Protocol where it considers that the State has failed or is unwilling to comply with its recommendations within the prescribed time period. Also, where the Commission takes the view that a case contains a serious or massive violation of human rights, it may transfer a case to the Court. Finally, the Commission may refer a case to the Court where a State has failed to comply with a request for provisional measures.

Where the Commission submits a case to the Court, it is entitled to appoint one or more Commissioners to represent it, who shall be assisted by a Legal Officer and/or appointed experts.

When submitting a case to the Court, the Commission must provide the Court with a file containing the following: (a) an application of seizure; (b) a summary of the case; and (c) a case file, which should contain all of the evidence, documents or information concerning the communication, including documents relating to any attempts to secure a friendly settlement, and the Commission’s decision. Finally, the case summary must include, where appropriate, the following: (a) the names of the representatives of the Commission; (b) the facts of the case; (c) all relevant Charter provisions that are alleged to have been violated; (d) the date on which the Commission adopted its decision, or adopted and sent the request for provisional measures; (e) the facts which reveal serious or massive violations; (f) the date on which the decision of the Commission was transmitted to the State party concerned; (g) information relating to the deadline stipulated under Rule 113; and (h) the parties to the proceedings before the Commission.

http://arcproject.co.uk/?p=200

The Future of the ACtHPR

A guest post by Marie O’Leary

In July 2004, just months after the Protocol for the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR) entered into force, the African Union initiated procedures to merge this court with its newly adopted African Court of Justice (ACJ). However, the Protocol and Statute of the combined court – adopted as the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR) – cannot enter into force until 30 days after the deposit of the instrument of ratification by 15 Member States. To date only 3 of the 53 Member States have ratified the ‘merged court’ ACJHR Protocol. Meanwhile, the separate courts of the ACtHPR and the ACJ continue to develop slowly as individual entities.

Background

The ACtHPR had only just entered into force in January 2004 when the AU Assembly of States Parties decided that the court should be combined with the recently created ACJ for greater economic efficiency and jurisdictional singularity. In July 2004, the Assembly of the African Union decided to merge the two courts it had created, and in 2005 tasked the Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs and former President of the International Court of Justice Mohamed Bedjaoui with drafting the merged court Statute. At the AU Summit in July 2008, the merged court Protocol and Statute were adopted.

The Merged Court

As indicated in the preamble to the ACJHR Protocol, the merged court is to become the overarching judicial institution of the AU, replacing the 1998 (ACtHPR) and 2004 (ACJ) Protocols.

The transition to a merged court was envisioned by the Assembly as being a seamless exercise by virtue of the transitional measures outlined in Chapter II of the ACJHR Protocol. This has not however been the case, as the merged court Protocol has yet to enter into force, awaiting ratification by 15 Member States. The merged court will eventually be seated in the home of the present ACtHPR in Arusha, Tanzania, and will receive any pending cases from the ACtHPR. The Judges and Registry of the ACtHPR will remain in place until new personnel can be appointed and the ACtHPR will continue to function for at least one year, or as long as necessary, following the practical creation of the ACJHR in order to ensure the handling of all outstanding and transitional matters.

The merged court will have broad jurisdiction over cases relating to all acts, decisions, regulations and directives of the organs of the Union, the AU Constitutive Act, the African Charter, all treaties and legal instruments adopted by the AU or OAU, the Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa and any other legal instrument relating to human rights. The court will also have jurisdiction over “any question of international law”.

Article 29 of the ACJHR’s Statute generally limits access to the court to State Parties to the Protocol, organs of the AU (as authorized by the Assembly) and staff members of the AU (within parameters of the AU Staff Rules and Regulations). However, Article 30 permits broader access to the court in those cases concerning alleged human rights abuses, including direct access by individuals under Article 30(f) but only in respect of those States which have lodged a separate declaration permitting such access (Article 8 (3) of the ACJHR Protocol).

The ACJHR is designed to have two specific divisions – ‘General Affairs’ and ‘Human Rights’. Articles 16-18 of the ACJHR Statute set out how the separate divisions will operate.

Some academics have expressed concern that the human rights division may be overshadowed by the ‘General Affairs’ division. Others consider that this separation of divisions – with separate judges – will allow for specialization and, at the same time, the reaping of benefits of lower overheads, i.e. shared premises with shared courtrooms and resources.

Ratification Process

The true advantages and disadvantages of a merged court system remain to be seen as the ACJHR awaits enactment by ratification. To date, the ACJHR Protocol has only received the signature of 22 Member States, while only three (3) have ratified and deposited: Libya (deposited 17 July 2009), Mali (deposited 27 August 2009) and Burkina Faso (deposited 4 August 2010) (for all signatories and ratifications, see here). Both the ACtHPR and ACJ required similar ratification (the ACtHPR Protocol was adopted in 1998, but the court did not open for business until 2006; the ACJ Protocol was adopted in 2003 but did not enter into force until 2009). The ratification process of the merged court looks set to be a longwinded process.

Access of Individuals

Article 30(f), in conjunction with Article 8(3) of the ACJHR creates a barrier to individual and NGO direct access, similar to that before the ACtHPR, whereby a Member State must lodge a separate declaration permitting such access before the court. To date, only 5 Member States before the ACtHPR have deposited such declarations.

Conclusion

At this stage, the merged court Protocol awaits the ratification of 12 more Member States in order to launch the institution of the ACJHR, which may take many years. In the meantime, it is essential that immediate efforts are made to increase awareness and build the capacity of existing human rights institutions in Africa, especially the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the pre-cursor to the permanent court, which cannot be allowed to fail.

Managing Expectations: The African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights and two failed applications

A guest post by Andrew Smith

The applications by Urban Mkandawire and Prof Efoua Mbozo’o to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR) both concerned complaints by public servants regarding the termination of their employment contracts. Both applications are considered together in this comment because neither was premised upon a claim that the respondent party had violated the applicants’ human rights, as contained in the African Peoples’ Charter on Fundamental Freedoms (the Charter) or any other human rights instrument, as required by Article 3 (1) of the Protocol. Both applications therefore raise similar issues.

While the application of Prof Mbozo’o was rejected on jurisdictional grounds in a decision summarised on the Court’s website, the application of Mr Mkandawire, also summarised on the Court’s website, was withdrawn less than two months after the Registry of the Court received it. The facts of these two cases are as follows.

003/2011 Urban Mkandawire v. The Republic of Malawi

In December 1999, Mr Urban Mkandawire, a citizen of Malawi and Staff Associate at the French Department at Chancellor College, was dismissed from his post on the recommendation of a Disciplinary Committee, following complaints that they had received from students regarding his teaching methods. The Registry of the Court received the application on 13 March 2011, but it has not been possible to ascertain a procedural history for Mr Mkandawire’s case prior to this communication. Malawi is one of the five States Parties to the Protocol that has made a declaration accepting the competence of the Court to receive applications from individuals under Article 5(3) of the Protocol.

Mr Mkandawire advanced three bases for his claim. He contended that (1) the fact that students complained about his teaching methods is an insufficient ground for the University to dismiss him; (2) the recommendations of the Disciplinary Committee to dismiss him amount to unfair labour practices; and (3) that the procedure followed by the University violated Section 31 (right to fair and safe labour practices and fair remuneration) and Section 43 (right to lawful and procedurally fair administrative action) of the Constitution of Malawi. He also argued that the dismissal violated his conditions of service in Papers No. 6083A – 6086A of the University Act (Cap. 30:02 of the Laws of Malawi). According to the summary provided, the application did not allege a violation of the Charter.

In terms of relief, Mr Mkandawire sought reinstatement to his post on the basis that he would not easily find alternative employment as an academician at the same level of seniority or salary. Mr Mkandawire also alleged that the state had failed in its obligation to displace the inference that fairness demanded his reinstatement. Mr Mkandawire also sought compensation for two months salary, professional and housing allowances, remuneration during the counselling period, the payment of damages and legal costs, and a refund of rent paid. His claim totalled 12,839,059 Malawian Kwacha (approximately £51,376).

On 19 May 2011, the Executive Secretary of the African Commission confirmed that the applicant had made a formal request to the Commission to have his communication withdrawn, and that the Commission had granted that request. No explanation as to why the application was withdrawn was provided. Because the application was withdrawn, the ACtHPR was denied the opportunity to decide the jurisdictional question it raised, as well as whether Mr Mkandawire had exhausted local remedies, and whether the ACtHPR has the competence to grant the forms of relief he requested under Article 27 of the Protocol. While these issues are left undecided in this case, the jurisdictional question seems to be answered in the decision relating to the application by Prof Mbozo’o.

010/2011 Prof Efoua Mbozo’o Samuel v Pan African Parliament

On 6 June 2011 Prof Efoua Mbozo’o Samuel, domiciled in Cameroon, brought a case against the Pan African Parliament, alleging a breach of paragraph 4 of his contract of employment and of Article 13 (a) and (b) of the OAU Staff Regulations, in addition to an improper refusal to renew his contract and to re-grade him. The original application to the Court, or a summary thereof, is not available on the Court’s website.

The application by Prof Mbozo’o did not specifically allege any violation of his human rights. By a letter dated 4th August 2011, the Registry requested that Prof Mbozo’o specify those violations as well as evidence of exhaustion of local remedies in accordance with Rule 34 (1) and (4) of the Rules of Court. Responding to this request in a letter dated 22nd August 2011, Prof Mbozo’o repeated the above claim, and in addition cited Executive Council Decision EX.CL/DEC 348 (XI) of June 2007 with regard to the remuneration and grading of his employment. The summary of the decision made in relation to the application of Prof Mbozo’o does not specify the relief he sought, if any.

Addressing the bases of the claim made by Prof Mbozo’o, the ACtHPR stated that disputes arising under the OAU Staff Regulations come under the competence of the Ad hoc Administrative Tribunal of the African Union.

Citing Article 3 (1) of the Protocol, the ACtHPR unanimously found that it had no jurisdiction to hear the case instituted by Prof Mbozo’o, and therefore rejected his application.

Comment

As noted by a number of contributors to this blog in recent weeks, various applications to the ACtHPR have been rejected on jurisdictional grounds. This raises an important question: what can the ACtHPR and those supporting the institution do better? Together, these two applications indicate that one area for improvement may be how the Court and its outreach support communicates its important but limited human rights remit to the communities within its jurisdiction.

A positive observation in relation to the applications of Mr Mkandawire and Prof Mbozo’o is that we can surmise that at least these two individuals knew of the Court’s existence, and perceived the ACtHPR to be a forum in which they could seek redress for the injustice they felt they had suffered in their domestic legal systems and from the administrative procedures of the OAU.

However, these failed applications also provide an early indication that there is a lack of effective communication and publicity as to the proper remit of the court.

Improving the outreach efforts of the ACtHPR ought to be prioritised in the coming years. The necessity of outreach is demonstrated by the experience of other international justice initiatives, particularly in relation to nations that have no experience of international tribunals, or do not have a strong domestic tradition of an impartial judiciary challenging the legality of state action on a human rights basis. In the cases of Mr Mkandawire and Prof Mbozo’o, it is clear that this should not only be an exercise in raising the profile of the Court, but also one of managing the expectations of what the Court can realistically achieve.

Communicating in legally accurate but accessible terms what human rights are, the purpose of the ACtHPR, the types of cases it is able to consider, and the circumstances and process by which individuals can communicate with the Court, is essential to the ACtHPR achieving its mandate. Maximizing access to information must be central to this programme, and the training of domestic judges and lawyers will be essential to these ends. The ACtHPR must prioritize these issues. The ARC project has been founded to assist the Court and its potential users in this vital process.

SOAS Panel Discussion: "Between Impunity and Show Trials"

On 3 February, in anticipation of the cases against Saif Gaddafi and Laurent Gbagbo, the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, presents a panel discussion with Jacques Verges, Martti Koskenniemi, Nabila Ramdani, Robert Murtfield and Polina Levina.

See below for poster and registration details.

http://www.internationallawbureau.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/SOAS-3.2.12.pdf

The ACHPR Flexes its Muscles in respect of the Situation in Libya

A guest blog by Barrie Sander

In an unprecedented move, on 25 March 2011 the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the “ACtHPR”) ordered provisional measures against Libya in the case of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. In light of subsequent developments in Libya, in particular the overthrow of the regime of Muammar al-Qaddafi, against whom the provisional measures were aimed, the practical relevance of these measures is now of minimal relevance. By contrast, the symbolic impact of the ACtHPR’s order cannot be overstated, and provides a useful insight into the ACtHPR’s approach to ordering such measures and an important indication that the ACtHPR is willing to flex its muscles when it matters.

The Application

On 24 February 2011, against a background of allegations of increasingly serious human rights violations taking place in Libya, in particular the violent repression of ongoing protests that started in Benghazi on 16 February 2011 and which had spread to other major cities and towns in the country, including the capital Tripoli, three non-governmental organisations (“NGOs”) (the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, Human Rights Watch, and INTERIGHTS) submitted a joint-application to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the “African Commission”) requesting provisional measures to:

(i) stop and prevent the use of unjustified lethal force against protesters, whether by the security forces, mercenaries or other bodies or individuals acting on behalf of the State;
(ii) allow people within Libya to air their grievances through peaceful protests;
(iii) allow the free flow of information, including by permitting international journalists to enter and report freely;
(iv) open up all forms of communication by restoring full use of internet, television stations, mobile phones and social networks;
(v) respect the rights of detainees;
(vi) ensure that those injured during the protests are permitted access to appropriate medical treatment; and
(vii) undertake a thorough, impartial and prompt investigation to hold accountable those responsible for these violations.

On 28 February 2011, the same three NGOs submitted a joint complaint against Libya to the African Commission urging it to “do all in its power to ensure that the Libyan authorities cease the violations including the use of legal force against protesters and infringements of their rights to freedoms of expression and assembly, and take immediate measures to safeguard the protesters’ rights as protected under the African Charter”.

After condemning the Libyan government’s “violence and use of force against civilians and suppression of peaceful demonstrators” on 25 February 2011 and further condemning “the bloody reprisal by the Government of the Great Socialist Peoples’ Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against its own population” on 1 March 2011, the African Commission finally instituted proceedings against Libya before the ACtHPR on 3 March 2011 “for serious and massive violations of human rights guaranteed under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights”. The application referred to the successive complaints against Libya that had been received by the African Commission, in particular that:

“peaceful demonstrations [...] were violently suppressed by security forces who opened fire at random on demonstrators killing and injuring many people, that [...] security forces engaged in excessive use of heavy weapons and machine guns against the population, including targeted aerial bombardment and all types of attacks, and that these actions amount to serious violations of the right to life and to the integrity of persons, freedom of expression, demonstration and assembly.”

The Order

The African Commission’s application did not request the ACtHPR to order provisional measures. However, under Article 27(2) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the “Protocol”) and Rule 51(1) of the ACtHPR’s Rules of Procedure, the ACtHPR is empowered to order provisional measures proprio motu “in cases of extreme gravity and urgency and when necessary to avoid irreparable harm to persons” and “which it deems necessary to adopt in the interest of the parties or of justice”.

In considering whether to order provisional measures, the ACtHPR divided its analysis into two parts.

First, the ACtHPR considered whether it had jurisdiction under Articles 3 and 5 of the Protocol. In this regard, the ACtHPR noted that, in the context of an order for provisional measures, it need not finally satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction on the merits of the case, but simply that it has jurisdiction to hear the case. With this in mind, the ACtHPR confirmed that:

• Libya had ratified both the African Charter (on 19 July 1986) and the Protocol (on 19 November 2003), both of which had since entered into force; in this way, Article 3(1) of the Protocol, which extends the jurisdiction of the Court to all cases and disputes submitted concerning the interpretation of the African Charter, the Protocol and any other relevant human rights instrument ratified by the State concerned, was satisfied; and

• The African Commission, as one of the entities listed in Article 5(1)(a) of the Protocol, was entitled to submit the present case to the ACtHPR.

The ACtHPR then turned to consider whether the circumstances of the case warranted an order of provisional measures. For this purpose, the ACtHPR relied heavily on resolutions and expression of concern in respect of the situation in Libya which had been issued by several international organisations, including the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, and the United Nations Security Council, to conclude that the “there is therefore a situation of extreme gravity and urgency, as well as a risk of irreparable harm to persons who are the subject of the application, in particular, in relation to the rights to life and to physical integrity of persons as guaranteed in the Charter”.

In this light, the ACtHPR unanimously ordered the following provisional measures:

• That Libya must immediately refrain from any action that would result in loss of life or violation of physical integrity of persons, which could be a breach of the provisions of the African Charter or of other international human rights instruments to which it is a party; and

• That Libya must report to the ACtHPR within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of the Order, on the measures taken to implement it.

Comment

There are many lessons to take away from the ACtHPR’s order for provisional measures.

First, the case demonstrates one of the potential routes by which NGOs and individuals can bring actions before the ACtHPR. Since Libya had not made a declaration under Article 34(6) of the Protocol, NGOs and individuals could not bring direct petitions against Libya. However, as this case illustrates, NGOs and individuals remained free to submit complaints to the African Commission, which could bring an action pursuant to Article 5(1)(a) of the Protocol. Given how few States have made declarations under Article 34(6) of the Protocol, the willingness of the African Commission to act on behalf of NGOs and individuals could prove increasingly important to the future of the ACtHPR’s jurisprudence.

Second, the case illustrates that the ACtHPR is willing to flex its muscles when it needs to. In particular, it should be remembered that the African Commission did not request provisional measures; the ACtHPR ordered them of its own accord. This is a positive sign for the legitimacy of the ACtHPR going forward.

Third, the case demonstrates the importance of resolutions and acts of international organisations and evidence collected by NGOs in persuading the ACtHPR to order provisional measures.

Despite all these positives, it should also be remembered that the efficacy of any order of the ACtHPR is ultimately dependent on the political will of the African Union. The ACtHPR lacks an independent enforcement power over its own orders or judgments. Instead, pursuant to Article 31 of the Protocol, the ACtHPR reports annually to the African Union’s Assembly of Heads of State and Government (the “Assembly”), specifying which States have failed to comply with its orders or judgments. Pursuant to Article 29 of the Protocol, it is the Council of Ministers of the African Union which is ultimately responsible for monitoring the enforcement of these orders or judgments on behalf of the Assembly.

Given the widely reported divisions within the African Union in respect of its response to the actions of Muammar al-Qaddafi’s regime in Libya, perhaps the most concerning lesson to take away from the ACtHPR’s first order for provisional measures is that the ACtHPR’s ability to make an impact on the ground in of cases of urgency could be stifled by political divisions within the African Union, the body ultimately responsible for enforcing the ACtHPR’s orders and judgements.